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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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
January 28, 1982

Senior Interdepartmental Group No. 12

To: OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke  
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler  
DOD - COL John Stanford  
CIA -   
OMB - Mr. William Schneider  
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell

Subject: SIG Meeting on Somalia

Attached is a discussion paper for the SIG meeting  
on Somalia scheduled for January 29, 4:00 p.m.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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GDS 1/28/88

State Dept. review

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ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR SOMALIABACKGROUND

In response to the President's decision, the SIG will address the questions of increased security assistance for Somalia, what such increased assistance might be used for, and how it can be provided. This assessment will complement the ongoing process of reviewing our general policy for the Horn of Africa, and developing security assistance, political, and economic measures for strengthening Somalia's security, and draw upon the recently concluded discussions with the Somali Minister of Defense, Omar Haji Mohamed.

The Somalis have obligated, or probably will obligate, approximately \$55 million of the \$60 million in FMS which is currently planned to be made available through FY 82.

3 AN/TPS-43 radars	-	\$	34	M
Vulcan Termination Liability	-		2	M
MTT to repair Soviet Radars	-		2	M
Trucks	-		9.5	M
Engineer Equipment	-		4.4	M
Radios	-		2.7	M
		\$	54.6	M

This would leave only a little over \$5 million for follow-on support, possible cost increases, FMS training cases and minor additional orders during FY 82.

Sales currently projected will help to respond to the political need for rapid, visible deliveries of U.S. equipment. They will not, however, add much to Somalia's very limited ability to defend against Ethiopian air or ground attack. One of Omar Haji's principal themes during his visit here was that Somalia urgently needs U.S. assistance in meeting their very real military requirements.

Options for Using Increased Assistance

Although it would not provide for major increases in Somalia's military forces, an additional \$10 million in grant FMS for FY 82 would allow Somalia to undertake one or more actions which, although relatively low in cost, would provide some significant improvement in Somalia's defense capabilities. Recognizing the Somalis would have to make the final choice, the IG suggested the following options:

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Repair Somalia's MIG-21 Interceptors. Somalia's current air defense has been sufficient to deter militarily effective attacks against major population centers and military installations. The system is, however, unable to deter politically damaging attacks against larger towns from high altitude or against villages and roads from any altitude. Ground based air defense systems are costly (\$10 million/fire unit for Rapier, \$80 million for a battery of Hawk) and it would be prohibitively expensive to try to defend all of Somalia, or even its larger towns with them.

The most cost-effective way of deterring these politically damaging attacks would probably be with interceptor aircraft. Most of Somalia's 10 MIG-21's are now inoperative, but it appears that, in conjunction with the Egyptians, we might be able to restore at least some of them to operable condition. We are in the process of determining if such a program is feasible. If it is, \$10 million in FY 82 would enable us at least to begin. Egypt would have to be compensated for its services and the issue of how to do so would need to be resolved. Purchase of services from Egypt with Somalia's FMS funds would raise the problems associated with off-shore procurement. Providing additional FMS funds to the Egyptians in compensation might reduce the political impact on the Somalis of our assistance. Repairing Somali MIG-21's would assist the Egyptians in fully using their developing defense industry, and would help promote stronger security relations between the two countries.

Provide Jeep-Mounted TOW. Another Somali vulnerability is its lack of anti-tank defense. Since the Italian M-47's have proven unsuitable, the anti-tank requirement remains unfilled. The most cost-effective way of improving Somalia's capability in this area probably would be through the purchase of TOW. We have already briefed the Somalis on a package of 20 jeep-mounted launchers and 400 missiles. This would cost approximately \$8.5 million. There is little question of the feasibility and effectiveness of such a package, and it is not as likely to excite Kenyan fears as the M-47 tanks appeared to do. Its major disadvantage is the 27 month lead time for production.

Assist in Obtaining Ammunition. Somali stocks of ammunition for their Soviet supplied weapons are very low, scarcely enough to sustain more than a day or so of combat. Although our ability to help is limited, anything we could do to assist them in procuring ammunition for such weapons as the BM-21 rocket launcher, 122 mm howitzers, and 37 mm air defense guns would have a strong effect on Somali capabilities.

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Support of non-Soviet Equipment. Not all of Somalia's inventory is of Soviet origin, and there are a few items of U.S. equipment, some of which were captured from Ethiopia in the Ogaden. This equipment includes over 300 106 mm recoilless rifles mounted on earlier model jeeps and approximately 20 M-113s. Provision of repair parts and ammunition for these would be relatively simple and inexpensive. The Somalis also have U.S. M-41 and British Centurion tanks. We no longer have the capability of supporting the M-41s, and support of the Centurions would require off-shore procurement.

Provide Additional Engineer or Communications Equipment. Although the Somalis are already planning to devote some \$7 million of their FY 82 FMS to the purchase of engineer and communications equipment, there is still a valid requirement for more. The Somalis have expressed a need for additional engineer equipment, some of it as simple as shovels, and will still need assistance in establishing a minimal communications, command and control system.

How to Provide such Assistance

Reprogramming. There was agreement that, in view of existing shortfalls, particularly in grant FMS, reprogramming additional assistance for Somalia would be very difficult and would require high-level decisions on the source of any funds to be reprogrammed.

Supplemental Budget Request. State is now working on a supplemental budget request for FY 82 which would be presented in March or April. As presently conceived, it would include over \$100 million to restore total FMS grant appropriations for FY 82 to the authorization level. The IG recommended that this supplemental include \$10 million in grant FMS for Somalia.

Additional Assistance for Kenya. There was strong opinion that increasing security assistance for Somalia above that requested from Congress, without also increasing U.S. assistance to Kenya, would jeopardize our access to Kenyan facilities essential to the support of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Kenyan President, in a recent meeting with our Ambassador, strongly complained about the low priority being accorded to assistance to Kenya. The Kenyans have also expressed concern over the prospect of increased security assistance to Somalia. Their reaction is likely to be intensified when they learn we are at the same time, providing Kenya with less than the amount requested.

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Some participants therefore stressed that additional funds for Somalia should be conditional upon maintaining a balance with Kenya -- otherwise, such a move would involve unacceptable risks to our present level of access to Kenyan facilities.

It was generally agreed that because of its economic problems, Kenya would probably not use additional guaranteed loans and that, if it were decided that a balance had to be achieved, it would require some form of grant assistance, something on the order of \$10 million in either FMS or ESF.

On the other hand, including an additional \$10 million for Kenya in the supplemental would mean that almost 20% of the supplemental would be devoted to the Horn of Africa. Given the lack of an obvious threat to Kenya from Ethiopia, and our previous decision to allocate less grant FMS to Kenya in FY 82 than we requested, it might be difficult to justify the urgency of the need now for increased funds.

The issue of whether or how to maintain a balance of some sort was not resolved by the IG.

#### SIG Actions

The SIG should provide recommendations on the following issues:

1. Whether an additional \$10 million in grant FMS for Somalia in FY 82 should be included in a supplemental budget request.
2. Whether additional security assistance should be provided to Kenya in FY 82 primarily to balance that proposed for Somalia.
3. Whether the options suggested for using additional security assistance to Somalia (repairing MIG-21's, purchasing TOW, assisting procurement of ammunition, supporting U.S. equipment in the Somali inventory, or providing additional engineer or communications equipment) are acceptable.

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Executive Secretary

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